NATIONAL PROGRAMME ISF

IDENTIFICATION OF THE DESIGNATED AUTHORITIES

Competent authorities responsible for the management and control systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Name of the authority</th>
<th>Head of the authority</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Email address</th>
<th>Date of designation</th>
<th>Activities delegated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Authority</td>
<td>Regional Policy Department of the Ministry of the Interior and the Economics and Finance Department of the Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td>Vice-minister of the MoI</td>
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<td>vilnius.rpd.ras <a href="mailto:tine@vrm.lt">tine@vrm.lt</a></td>
<td>2015-05-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delegated Authority</td>
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</table>

Management and control system

In 2012, the audit carried out by the European Commission (EC) for assessing the functioning of the management and the control of the External Borders Fund (EBF) and the Return Fund, found the management and control system to be operating well. Consequently, a similar management and control system was set up for the ISF.

The RA is responsible for the management and control of the ISF national programme and handles all communication with the EC.

The DA is responsible for appropriate use of allocated funds.

The AA assesses whether the prospective RA complies with the designation criteria, issues an opinion addressed to the designating authority, conduct system and financial audits, as well as random checks of selected projects and technical assistance.

The Monitoring Committee conducts supervision over implementation of the ISF national programme.
1. **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The principal priorities of the National Internal Security ensure policy include fighting crime, ensuring public order and personal security of the State, in addition a reliable State border control and protection complying with the relevant EU requirements, with a special attention to the control and protection of the external border of the EU.

**Visas and Borders**

One of the priorities of the Lithuanian foreign policy is to ensure a closer cooperation with the neighbouring States (Poland, Latvia, Russia and Belarus) and a stronger interface with Member States of the EU and the NATO. Lithuania aims to conclude or to expand the existing agreements with Norway and to complete the agreements with Czech Republic, Malta and Switzerland under which Lithuania will be representing other Member States when issuing Schengen visas, or will delegate the right to the Member States to issue the Schengen visas for entry into Lithuania to third country nationals.

Lithuania will use its resources to support the policy on cooperation between consular offices, the concept of integrated border management (IBM), the correct and harmonised application of the Union acquis on border control and visa as well as advanced personal check-up technologies at border crossing points.

In the upcoming seven years the full implementation of the VIS, working places at visa services and training of staff, the reinforcement of external border checks and surveillance systems (acquisition of operating equipment, means of transport and communication systems required for effective and secure border control and the detection of person, development of EUROSUR, maintenance and upgrade of SIS II, upgrading databases and IT solutions used to exchange information and criminal intelligence) as well as training of border guards will be addressed with the support of the ISF.

The aimed result will include (1) an enhanced capability of border guards and consular services to carry out border surveillance and to liaise with other law enforcement services within the framework of the European surveillance system (EUROSUR); (2) to manage visa applications flows at consular posts and (3) to improve the handling of passenger flows at border crossing points.

An important specific outcome should be the setting up of the EU entry exit system and an EU registered travellers programme.

9.23% of the Borders programme is intended to be allocated to the specific objective 1: Support a common visa policy; 85.43% – to the specific objective 2: Borders; 5.34 % – to the specific objective 3: Operating support.
**Preventing and combating crime**

Lithuania will focus on the following key types of crime identified as priorities: drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings, cybercrime, money laundering, corruption, organised crime against property.

Lithuania aims at 1) improving its commitment to the EU policy cycle on serious and organised crime; 2) improving of operational cooperation between relevant EU and 3rd actors, both at national and international level; 3) enhancing capabilities by technical development; 4) implementation of anti-corruption measures; 5) improving information exchange between all partners and target groups involved; 6) enhancing knowledge of the law enforcement officers.

89.38% of the Police programme is intended to be allocated to the specific objective 5: Preventing and combating crime.

**Risk and crisis**

With regard to the protection of the critical infrastructure and the crisis and security risk management, Lithuania will focus on the critical infrastructure security, crisis prevention, response coordination and information exchange among all involved partners – state institutions, private sector and academia.

Lithuania aims at: 1) enhancing readiness, preparedness, prevention and repression on the basis of the national risk assessment; 2) improving cooperation, information and best practice exchange among all involved partners; 3) strengthening the critical infrastructure security through additional measures, methodical guidance and recommendations for critical infrastructure operators, especially in the area of cyber security.

10.62% of the Police programme is intended to be allocated to the specific objective 6: Risk and crisis management.

**Special Transit Scheme (STS)**

The resources allocated to Lithuania for ensuring the smooth functioning of the STS will be used for the compensation of foregone fees and for additional costs, which result directly from the specific requirements of implementing the operation of the STS and which are not generated as a result of the issuing of visas for the purpose of transit or other purposes.
2. BASELINE SITUATION IN THE MEMBER STATE

The baseline situation is a summary of the state of play as of December 2013 in the Member State for the fields relevant to the Fund.

Visas

The number of visas issued has been increased. 51 consular representations issued 465,283 Schengen visas in 2013. 85 consular officials and 106 technical employees are working on the representations with approximately costs of 13,315,000 € per year. In order to ensure the smooth management of the increasing number of customers, the further improvement of technical/human resources and infrastructural conditions is essential.

Lithuania is represented by other Schengen State in 64 posts. In its turn, Lithuania represents other Schengen States in 13 consular posts. The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) regularly assesses the possibility for consular cooperation at each location. Furthermore, Lithuania cooperates with external service providers (ESPs) in visa procedures on certain locations, namely in Russia and Ukraine.

Currently, Lithuania still has the need to be represented in Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Iraq, Libya and Nepal.

With the EBF support, Lithuania implemented several projects: the development of the national VIS and Register of Foreigners, the acquisition of hardware to end-users to ensure VIS roll-out, the renovation of consular premises of the Republic of Lithuania in New York and in Almaty, as well as the training of consular officials.

Lithuania underlines the importance of further evolution of the national VIS in accordance with evolutions of the central VIS and the Visa Code as well as to ensure a sufficient capacity, safety and business continuity of the national VIS. Gradually renewal of hardware to end-users is no less important. Furthermore, communication lines are not sufficiently reliable and the re-establishment of normal working conditions in emergency situations is time consuming.

Consular officials and staff of visa services are properly trained; nevertheless, pre-deployment as well as continuous training is required due to novelties in the EU acquis, technologies and working methods.

Borders

Along the 951 km external land border and 119.6 km maritime border of Lithuania with Belarus and Russia 19 road, 5 railway, 4 river, 4 sea and 4 air BCPs are operating. The infrastructure of all BCPs complies with the relevant basic requirements. The VIS is fully rolled out at all EU BCPs. The State Border Guard Service under the Ministry of Interior (SBGS) is responsible for the control of the external EU borders. More than 49 million € (incl. staff costs for 3,681 members) was spent on border management in 2013.

An average of 11 million people cross the external borders of Lithuania every year. In order to facilitate both exit and entry for frequently travelling bona fide travellers, to speed up border crossing and to decrease congestions and waiting times continuous developments are required.

On average, 408 cases of illegal border crossings are recorded per year. The majority of the apprehended migrants are nationals of Belarus, Russia, Kirgizstan, Vietnam and the Republic of Georgia.

Latest trends do not show that an irregular migration across Ukraine affects the EU external border controlled by Lithuania. However, the probability of such a trend remains and dependent very much
The situational picture of the land border and territorial sea of Lithuania is available at the National Coordination Centre (NCC). The NCC is operating at the SBGS HQ. There are 15 officials working in the NCC.

Although the general setup of the IBM is already implemented, some aspects of cooperation are lacking in efficiency, therefore the interaction between the relevant authorities and/or the technical means required for enhanced cooperation have to be improved.

The national land border surveillance system covers most vulnerable sections of the border with Russia (130.5 km) and with Belarus (92.6 km). The border surveillance system needs further to be installed at all most vulnerable land border sections with Belarus (192.5 km).

The previously installed surveillance systems need to be upgraded by replacing certain elements/segments at the border with Russia (129.4 km), Belarus (67.6 km) and the coastline (119.6 km).

The required border control systems have been established, but in many cases further improvement will also be necessary. Operating equipment, such as detection tools and terminals for consulting systems as well as means of transport for the control of external borders need to be upgraded.

A secure criminal intelligence information system allowing a secure networking is necessary.

As regards the EvalCom recommendations, the only outstanding recommendation is to provide continuous training related to different aspects of border control (further improvement of relevant knowledge of English and Russian languages, document examination, the SIS II new functionalities and other topics).

The technical and IT developments as well as training in the field of border control have been ensured mainly with EBF support.

Automated Border Control (ABC) systems at the BCPs have not been installed thus far. The reasons for non-installation were absence of biometric data verification system and relatively low passenger flows.

The national SIS II has been introduced with support provided by the SF and the EBF. The SIS II needs to be further developed as there is only one access point (Site A) operational in the Testa network; the physical security measures are depreciated, there is no facility in place for inquiries into the central SIS II. The outstanding tasks include the development of a full national system redundancy on identified key components/processes, including up-to-date cyber security measures. The capacity servers and data repositories need to be increased.

Mobility for border guards is provided by transport means and patrol boats. 700 out of 950 land, sea and air vehicles are co-financed by the SF and SOLID funds.

Voice communication among border guards, police, public safety forces and different institutions is ensured via the Digital Mobile Radio Communication System (DMRCS). The information System of Home Affairs (VRIS) ensures additional services (data, applications, etc.) for home affairs institutions. DMRCS and VRIS require maintenance, upgrading and replacement of hardware. Furthermore, DMRCS has to be connected with the voice communication networks of Poland and Latvia.

The document and fingerprint readers, the document checking devices, IT systems used at the BCPs have been modernised mainly with the EBF.

**Crime**

Considering the types of transnational or organised crime (OC) the development in Lithuania is
following the EU trends. The police, the main responsible authority for prevention and fight against crime, spent 50.8 million € in 2013 in fighting crime. With the value of 4.82 million €, 11 ISEC projects have been implemented.

Lithuania’s participation in the EU’s policy cycle is not efficient enough. Therefore the revision of the national threat assessment mechanism, the establishment of national infrastructures and the intensification of participation in joint operations are needed. The participation in international operations (2013: 40) generated the need for strengthening of criminal intelligence and technical competencies.

One of the main goals of Lithuania is an efficient prosecution of financial crimes. An increase by 24.8% of crimes to the financial system in 2013 (5,621) as compared to 2012 has been recorded. In line with the Council’s final report on financial investigation recommendations, Lithuania drew up specific action plans, proposals, signed international agreements, carried out an analysis of the process for data collection, approved the inter-institutional training programme and performed other actions recommended in the Council’s report. However, the Financial Crime Investigation Service (FCIS) lack of a detailed methodology to ensure the monitoring of the economic background of OCGs which shall be tackled by the fund. Horizontal administrative capacities of financial investigations should be enhanced from national budget.

The number of delicts related to drug-trafficking has become stable over the last few years (2013: 2,354; 2.83 % of all offences). The Anti-Drug units fulfil its international obligations in accordance to the core values of the EMPACT priorities. Repressing and preventing of drug trafficking also aims at fighting related money laundering. Even though the demand for narcotic and psychotropic substances within the country is rather limited, various types of drugs can be found on the market. The most disturbing factor is cross-border drug trafficking including synthetic drugs as well as new psychoactive substances. Modern laboratory equipment, cooperation with colleagues and officers’ professionalism is needed. The Customs Criminal Service lacks of modern investigation technologies, including IT equipment and various special tools for surveillance, information collection, record and analysis.

90% of all the on-going public procurements are transferred to e-Environment. Legal entities are deprived of the possibility to finance political parties and political campaigns. The funded health care services have been made public, all the in-patients are provided with an access to information on their treatment’s costs. The allocations from the national budget for fighting corruption and improving integrity amount to around 18 million € per year. Under the OLAF HERCULE II Technical Assistance Programme, the Special Investigation Service acquired special equipment for the detection of corruption-related crimes. However, raising awareness of corruption in public procurements, health care, financing of political parties as well as increasing the ownership of anti-corruption measures among public authorities still remains a challenge. It is necessary to focus on actions of facilitating the exchange of information (e.g. databases, interfaces) and developing anti-corruption education activities.

Crimes related to unlawful or malicious treatment of ICT (2013: 622) and unlawful activities related to electronic means of payment (2013: 4,179) is the main stream at the moment. Lithuania has already undergone a number of reforms and developments in this area through building operational and analytical capacities for investigations and cooperation with international partners. Lithuania participates in the EMPACT Priority G “Cybercrime Attacks”. The Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau is fully aware of its responsibilities and carries out operational activities arising from the Europol FP Cyborg and FP Twins. Progress to be achieved in the field of coordination, information-exchange and cooperation between national and international stakeholders, especially with Europol, remains high on the agenda.

Lithuania has fulfilled its legislative obligation related to the implementation of Directive 2011/36/EU.
However, the number of THB victims (2013: 47) and delicts related to sexual exploitation (2013: 244) is increasing. The basic-level victim protection system is functioning well. However, improvement of cooperation, victim-protection and reintegration is a continuous need. Training programmes for many LE officials cover basic knowledge of the EU instruments and the EU dimension of day-to-day policing. However, an improvement of cross-border minded culture of LE officials is needed. The low foreign language skills of LE officials hampering the effective cross-border cooperation. The lack of platforms for an exchange of experience and the limited access to up-to-date material also hinder efficient cooperation.

In terms of the threat assessment, the methods are insufficient and not harmonised. The results of the assessment mechanisms are not incorporated at each level.

**Risk and crisis**

Radicalisation and dissemination of propaganda in the Internet, migrating individuals and terrorist organisations emerging from foreign countries lead to increasing terrorism threats in Lithuania.

To ensure proper readiness and preparedness, regular trainings and exercises are organised for first responders, state institutions and other involved actors. However, there is a need to further strengthen information exchange and communication.

There is a need to focus on achieving enhanced awareness on the phenomenon of radicalisation among frontline practitioners and increased know-how on preventing, mitigating and tackling the phenomenon. Training programmes must be launched aiming at the recognition of early signs of radicalisation.

Currently, police lacking tools for information collection and exchange, protective gear for police officers and forensic equipment for carrying out examination.

Lithuanian police anti-terrorist operations unit ARAS has the necessary equipment and is ready to help in time of need ATLAS members (2013: 1 operation in Estonia).

The past three years, in summary 5 CBRN-E incidents were of intentional character, 2 incidents were qualified as not real threats. There is a lack of training curricula and educated trainers. For the proper investigation of CBRN-E incidents police lacks of modern equipment.

**Special Transit Scheme**

In the last few years (from 2010 to 2013) the number of Russian citizens that applied for a FTD was increasing, while the number of applicants for a FRTD was decreasing. In 2013, the relevant authorities received 19,908 FTD and 413,947 FRTD applications.

In 2013, 795,166 travellers carrying FRTD and 237,644 travellers with FTD were checked at the Lithuanian border control points. In the course of the past five years the number of checked travellers remained nearly unchanged.

With the infrastructure established and developed, equipment purchased and installed, the future needs are mainly related to habitual, recurrent additional costs such as upgrading the infrastructure, the timely replacement of equipment and means of transport, the training of staff and the operational costs.
### 3. PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>3.1.</th>
<th>SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 1: Support a Common Visa Policy / ISF-B Article 3(2)(a)</th>
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</table>

In implementing the common visa policy and with a view to facilitate legitimate travelling, as well as addressing the issue of illegal migration, the MFA is systemically providing methodological recommendations to visa services of the Republic of Lithuania abroad, drawing up amendments to national legal acts and organising training for officers of consular offices. The experts delegated by the MFA to participate in the Schengen evaluation mission provide comments and proposals on the best practice when implementing acquis of the EU.

The MFA strategy for Common Visa Policy defines the following tasks:
- ensure a smooth application of the EU Visa Code;
- efficiently use the network of external service providers for the collection of data and visa applications (including the collection of biometric identifiers);
- develop a representation network;
- improve professional qualification of employees with a view to ensure an efficient servicing of individuals.

For the servicing of visa applicants, Lithuania plans, *inter alia*, the following measures:
- The development of international cooperation by organising different visits, providing consultations;
- The implementation of the experience gained and (staff) training projects.

While aiming to ensure the enforcement of the common EU visa policy and in order to respect the needs of travellers, Lithuanian consular service has been devoting special attention to the development of the representation network and the cooperation with ESPs in certain locations.

In order to ensure the extension of visa application facilities and the improved quality of visa procedures, 2 new consular offices are planned to be opened in 2015: South Africa Republic and Los Angeles. The opening of new representations and the costs of the personnel will be funded from the national budget.

In order to ensure an efficient and customer-oriented visa issuance procedure operational equipment and infrastructural conditions of the Embassies of the Republic of Lithuania in Sweden, Poland, Denmark, Belgium, Norway, United Kingdom, United States, Netherlands, Estonia, Latvia, France, Czech Republic, Italy, Switzerland, Finland, Austria, Spain, Germany, Canada, Greece, Ireland, Hungary, Romania, Sao Paulo, Consulates General in New York, Chicago and Consulates in Valencia, Sejny will be improved basically from national resources.

Within the framework of the national ISF programme it is planned to upgrade the technical and communication equipment of the working places of 17 key Visa services (Embassies of the Republic of Lithuania in Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Turkey, Egypt, China, India, Consulates General in Grodno, Almaty, Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg and Consulate in Sovetsk), to organise training for consular officers and the staff of visa services and to develop the national VIS as well. The full implementation of the VIS, including the roll-out to the last set of regions, will be a priority.
### 3.1.1 National objective 1: National Capacity - Visa / ISF Article 9(2)(b)

**Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:**

- Implementation of the national VIS: procurement of hardware for VIS national site, national VIS software evolutions, equipment and software of end users, training. The VIS maintenance and running costs will be assured under the ISF operating support.
- Upgrading of technical and communication equipment of working places at visa services: procurement of scanners, personal computers, printers for visa stickers, communication equipment (router, firewall, converters, equipment for VPN tunnels), as well as office equipment for key visa services

**Results:**
- Full implementation of the VIS including VISMAIL available and operational
- The VIS roll-out in consulates from the third and last set of regions
- The VIS use for the issuance of Schengen visas and fingerprint verifications at the border
- Technical and communication equipment upgraded at 17 key visa services
- Installed and maintained point to point lines with the Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania in China and other consular offices (up to 4 offices)
- Increased flow of transmitted data
- Safe data processing and protection against possible external threats.

### 3.1.2 National objective 2: Union Acquis - Visa / ISF Article 9(2)(g)

**Due to the rotation of consular officers and in order to keep the knowledge updated training must be organised on a regular basis. Approximately 90% of the staff trainings will be co-financed by ISF.**

**Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:**

- Training for consular officers
  - Intended themes: Review and implementation of the developments in the Visa Code; Local consular cooperation; Developments in the case law in examination of cases according to complaints regarding refusal of issue visas/revocation of issued visas; Introduction to the functionality and tools of the VIS; Trends in document counterfeits and methods for identification; Problems related to the representation for other Schengen States when issuing Schengen visas.
- Regional training for employees of visa services
  - Intended themes: Issues of practical application of the Visa Code; Application of the simplification of the procedure for the issue of visas between the European Union and third countries; Problems related to the representation for other Schengen States when issuing Schengen visas; Communication with applicants, information of the public and the internal organisation of work.

One course for consular officers and 2-3 regional training courses will be arranged every year.
### 3.1.3 National objective 3: Consular cooperation / ISF-B Article 9(2)(c)

No funding priorities are planned under this national objective.

### 3.1.4 Specific Action 1: Consular cooperation / ISF-B Annex II

In order to increase the “consular coverage” in Schengen visa issuance, to strengthen and to expand consular representation for other Schengen States in examining applications and issuing visas, employees would be seconded for permanent positions at the Lithuanian Consulate General in Almaty which represents other Member States and cooperates with an external service provider in Joint visa application center. Fund resources would be used to second such employees.

The number of visa applications examined at the consular offices is steadily increasing. With a view to creating best possible conditions for the reception of applicants, the repair works at the General consulate of the Republic of Lithuania in Almaty will be completed in 2014.

Starting 2015 additional positions of one consular officer and one technical employee will be opened at the Visa Service of Lithuania in Almaty.

Schengen House Ulanbaator, Mongolia, leading state Czech Republic: The Republic of Lithuania will be represented in the visa issuance in Ulanbaator by the Czech Republic. Partner states will participate only on non-cost basis.

### 3.2. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 2: Borders

Lithuania will focus on the development of the IBM, inter-institutional and international cooperation, improving the reaction capability of patrol units, risk assessment of maritime targets, enhancing of border guard skills and competencies needed for operational interoperability throughout the further specialised training activities. All these measures will be carried out in accordance with Article 3.3 b (ii) and (iii) of Regulation EU No 515/2014.

With a view to implement the IBM concept it is planned to enhance real-time exchange and cooperation between NCC and other authorities, to install new and upgrade the existing border surveillance systems. By the end of 2014 surveillance systems of the SBGS and all relevant authorities (the Navy, Maritime Safety Administration and Klaipėda Sea Port Authority) were integrated into a single system and since then the National Situational Picture is being produced by the NCC.

The national border surveillance system will be extended according to the risk analysis and the changed security situation at selected sections of the external borders. A part of resources will be allocated for upgrading of the previously installed land border surveillance systems. The extension and upgrading of the surveillance systems will be ensured under the ISF. The border surveillance systems will be continuously maintained by the national resources.

In order to duly fulfil functions of territorial maritime border control, the maritime border surveillance system should be modernised.

Lithuania will take into account and carry out the recommendations of the SchEval with respect to the air, land and sea borders, where necessary.

Lithuanian border guards’ professional skills and competencies will be supported by standardised
vocational education and further training. The aim will be the development of a common European BG culture. Lithuania will continue to participate in the development, management and execution of operations organised by Frontex.

It is planned to acquire access to ICAO PKD. The exchange of PKI certificates and certificate revocation lists will be reliable and timely.

It is foreseen to focus on ensuring the implementation of the disaster recovery and business continuity plan, as well as the back-up components of national SIS II.

With the aim of ensuring proper control and monitoring of the borders, taking into account the abolition of border checks at the internal border and strengthening of border checks and surveillance at the external border, it is planned to invest into modern, interoperable equipment, technical means for border control, as well as into strengthening the technical base for the risk analysis and crime intelligence.

Taking into account the results presented in the Final Operational Research Report of on ABC in Vilnius conducted by Frontex it was decided that installation of the ABC gates at the Vilnius national airport (VNO) through the ISF would not be economically feasible and justified.

3.2.1 National objective 1: EUROSUR / ISF-B Article 9 (2)(a)

Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:

- **Strengthen exchange of information** among all the authorities responsible for external border surveillance by obtaining advanced electronic data processing and transmission techniques in order to maintain the National Situational Picture with information on:
  - the status and the position of available assets, areas of operation and information on environmental conditions at the external border;
  - all incidents contained in the events layer (related to illegal migration, cross-border crime, crisis situations);
  - analytical reports, risk rating trends, regional monitoring.

- **Development of national border surveillance system**

  Having assessed the risk factors and threat in individual sections of the external border the land border surveillance system should be installed at the most vulnerable border sections with Belarus: 40.13 km at Pavoverė Frontier Station (FS), 44.26 km at Švenčionys FS, 25 km at Tribonys FS and 14 km at one more vulnerable section – total 123.39 km. The specific technical solution for the surveillance system will be selected having regard to the natural specificity of individual external border sections.

  The previously installed land border surveillance systems at the border with the Russian Federation (127.5 km) and at the border with Belarus (66.1 km) should be upgraded. Due to a high level of deterioration the components of the system (thermal cameras, night vision devises, fixed cameras, turning mechanisms, optical converters, radars, sensor alarm systems, etc.) must be replaced.

  In order to develop reaction capability the maritime border surveillance system (119.6 km) should be upgraded. EU funds will be used to replace day-night video surveillance cameras in 7 maritime border surveillance towers, to replace cameras and thermal imaging equipment and to upgrade the control programme in operator working places at the Neringa, Kopgalis, Palanga.
Frontier Stations and the Coast Guard Frontier District. All the systems will be integrated into one single system.

Results:
- Quick reaction capability
- Quality of analytical reports improved
- Increased the NSP-level situational awareness
- 3 new local coordination centres at the land border with Belarus (at Pavoverė FS, Švenčionys FS and Trabonys FS) established
- 4 local coordination centres at the land border with the Russian Federation (at Bardinai, Viešvilė, Plaškiai and Vileikiai FSs), 2 local coordination centres at the land border with Belarus (Padvarionys and Lavoriškės FSs), 1 regional (at the Coast Guard Frontier District) and 3 local maritime coordination centres (at Neringa, Palanga and Kopgalis FSs) modernised.

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<th>3.2.2</th>
<th>National objective 2: <strong>Information exchange</strong> / ISF-B Article 9 (2)(d)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No funding priorities are planned under this national objective. Information exchange between relevant national authorities in charge of border management will be strengthened through the actions addressed to the national objectives 1, 3, 4 and 6 (communication systems and training courses).</td>
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<tr>
<th>3.2.3</th>
<th>National objective 3: <strong>Common Union Standards</strong> / ISF-B Article 9 (2)(e and f)</th>
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<td>Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Implementation of the biometric data verification system (Stage II) in order to automatically verify the physical and electronic protection measures of travel documents</td>
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<td>To fulfill the requirements of Commission decision C (2009) 7476 it is required that a robust communication infrastructure is implemented for regular inter-country communication covering DV certificate exchange. A single point of contact (SPOC) acts as an interface for communication between Member States. Lithuania aims to establish a national SPOC infrastructure to carry out regular key management related tasks.</td>
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<td>In order to keep a continued implementation of the biometric data verification system, Lithuania seeks to fully participate in the ICAO PKD with the set-up and operation of the technical infrastructure for the connection to the ICAO PKD.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In this relation certain measures are planned to be implemented: a single point of contact (SPOC) infrastructure; a connection to the ICAO PKD; training of staff on working with the systems.</td>
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<td>- Harmonisation of radio communication with Poland and Latvia through installation of the voice information communication networks integration equipment and 4 common (virtual) voice information exchange channels</td>
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<td>A large amount of base stations of DMRCS installed at the external borders of the EU provide a reliable radio communications (voice and data services) for border guards. The DMRCS can be interconnected and expanded using...</td>
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different radio network connection interfaces and technical measures to define the radio communication scope of the newly established virtual channels. Having established network connection, interfaces and virtual communication channels, the state authorities of Lithuania, Poland and Latvia that are involved in border management will have a more efficient and secure way of communication.

- Upgrading of the main and the back-up centres of the information system VRIS for the purposes of carrying out border control through components, like an access control system, fire protection, power supply and conditioning systems

Currently data on the third country nationals and vehicles having crossed the external EU border is collected and analysed by the SBGS Information System VSATIS. The VSATIS, national VIS and SIS are physically located in the same premises as VRIS and use common consolidated infrastructure. The VRIS, based on joint information technology and telecommunications infrastructure, ensures data exchange among the VSATIS and SIS, VIS, FR and Interpol’s database.

Results:
- Development and improvement of structures, systems and technical equipment in order to improve the implementation of the Schengen acquis.

3.2.4 National objective 4: Union Acquis - Borders/ ISF-B Article 9(2)(g)

Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:
- Specialised and advanced training of border guards aimed to improve professional competences and skills

  Depending on the border guard job profile and specific operational requirements, further training will be organised for border guards aiming to enhance competences needed for:
  - management of information regarding border situational awareness and risk analysis to enhance the reaction capability;
  - usage of new technical systems (EUROSUR) and operating of stationary and/or mobile equipment for external borders surveillance;
  - management of irregular migration;
  - combating of cross-border crime at external borders (incl. human smuggling, detection of stolen vehicles etc.);
  - usage of professional English (and/or Russian) for carrying out border guard daily tasks and in cross-border cooperation incl. joint operations;
  - application of new IT and new work methods for border checks/document check and investigation.

Training activities will be brought in line with the sectorial qualifications frameworks (SQF) for border guarding. Aiming to strengthen international experience exchange on border guarding issues, participation in joint training activities (such as Joint European Cross
Border Cooperation Study Module or similar) is planned. Aiming to increase border guards readiness for a closer cooperation with the Police and Customs and to achieve the highest level of interoperability, a specialised joint training on IBM concept-related matters is to be organised. In this context, representatives of border guard, police and customs training institutions from Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland as well as from 3rd countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova) will be involved in joint training activities.

- Implementation of the recommendations made in Schengen evaluations

In order to implement SchEval recommendations, training of border guard officials will be provided in regard to these fields:
- managerial capability;
- communication in foreign languages related to both fulfilling of border guards daily duties and tasks and operational communication during joint operations;
- reaction capability, incl. detection of illegal border activities, identifying of targets and transmitting of related information via the available reporting systems;
- border checks procedures at a BCP, incl. interviewing and profiling techniques;
- operational interoperability between air and land or maritime units;
- risk analysis and profiling;
- dog handling of service dogs;
- dealing with asylum seekers, vulnerable persons, victims of trafficking;
- further development of distance training.

Possible new recommendations of the SchEval or other EU agencies analysis will be dealt with and possible with ISF funding.

3.2.5 National objective 5: Future challenges / ISF-B Article 9(2)(h)

Currently national entry/exit system VSATIS is not adapted to receiving data collected by other countries on traveller entry/exit and provides for no possibility to identify the duration of the stay of the third country nationals.

A new module should be developed for the Registered Travel Programme of the Foreigners Register.

Development, maintenance and infrastructure of the national components of Smart Borders will be dependent on the adoption of relevant Union legislative acts defining IT systems and their communication infrastructure.

3.2.6 National objective 6: National capacity – Borders / ISF-B Article 9(2)(b)

Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:
- Implementation of the national SIS

Although the SIS II is very stable, a back-up site of SIS II must be established. The following measures are planned to be implemented: procurement of
hardware for SIS national site, national SIS software evolutions, equipment and software for end users, protection of the SIS II national systems (both physical and against hacking), creation of the back-up site, support of the SIRENE office operations and competence-building measures

The service costs, such as maintenance and repair, will be assured under the ISF operating support mechanism. A systematic check of the INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database during border cross operations will be available in 2015.

- Upgrading of software and hardware. In order to ensure compatibility between systems for data exchange it is planned to acquire computers and upgrade servers for border guards
- Acquisition of technical means for border control: procurement of vehicles (cars, all-terrain vehicles, minibuses, four wheel motorcycles, minibuses and trailers (capable of driving on and off paved or gravel surface) equipped for transporting of service dogs, etc.), portable thermal imaging cameras, service dogs, dog training equipment, dog handling aids and dog training installations at dog training facilities
- Establishment of a secure IT based platform for the management of classified information on the external border management by obtaining modern technical tools, an installed information system and a secure data transmission network

With a view to enhance the joint risk analysis capacity enabling exchange of analytical findings between other MS and FRONTEX, it is envisaged to develop tools for secure connection, including a workplace with standardised specifications for secure videoconferencing across the Member States

Results:
- SIS II available and in operational; SIRENE office in operation; SIS II has a full disaster recovery/ business continuity plan; SIS II national system is resilient to cyber-attacks in terms of physical, computer and data security
- Improved reaction capability of patrol units
- Acceleration of transfer and dissemination of criminal intelligence information; improved SBGS contribution to Europol’s SOCTA

### 3.2.7 Specific Action 2. FRONTEX Equipment / ISF-B Annex II

- Purchasing of thermal vision vehicle.

A mobile (self-propelled) surveillance system based on a vehicle platform will consist of thermal imaging equipment, land and coastal surveillance radars, special optical devises, a secure radio communication and data transfer equipment, handheld radio stations, computers and dog transportation devices (dog crates installed inside the vehicle).

The mobile system will be purchased under a secure, negotiated procedure without prior publication of a call for tender and be used for joint operations organised by Frontex.

### 3.3 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 3: Operating Support / Article 10(2) of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014
Lithuania hereby confirms its compliance with the Union’s acquis on borders and visa.

Lithuania hereby confirms its compliance with the Union’s standards and guidelines for good governance on borders and visa, in particular the Schengen catalogue for external border control, the Practical Handbook for border guards and the Handbook on visa.

### 3.3.2 National objective: operating support for VISA

- Operational management of the national VIS

Implementation of the national VIS is financed under the national objective 1. Within the operating support mechanism Lithuania wants to finance the maintenance and running costs of the national VIS.

**Task:** Implementation of the VIS and Register of Foreigners (FR); ability to provide continuous operations of the national VIS.

**Services:** maintenance and repair of the VIS and FR.

Operating support include comprehensive operational management and regular scheduled maintenance for all facility supporting infrastructure and assets or, simply, preventive maintenance for specific assets in the national VIS infrastructure.

In a broad sense the national VIS consists of 2 systems: the national VIS and the Register of Foreigners (FR). The FR is used at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, performs all visa issuance functions; the Visa Data Base is part of the FR. All consular offices are connected to the FR by secure communication lines. The FR is used by the Migration Department of Ministry of the Interior and by border guards, and all BCPs are connected to it. Both the national VIS and the FR servers are physically located at the Information Technology and Communications Department under the Ministry of the Interior, which is the lead authority (technical functions). The national VIS performs only the role of the communication switch between the central VIS and FR.

The management of the national VIS and the FR, storing the data of visa applicants, is in the hand of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI).

Operators of the national VIS and the FR:
- Department of Informatics and Communications under the MoI;
- Consular offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Migration, the territorial migration offices and the territorial offices of the SBGS collect the data of visa applicants, including biometric, and issue visas.

In terms of the security of the system, it is fully integrated into the security policy of the IT infrastructure. The security of the national VIS data and the FR is governed by the Regulations on the national VIS data security approved by Order of the Minister of the Interior.

### 3.3.3 National objective: operating support for Borders

- Operational management of the national SIS

Implementation of the SIS II including of back-up capability is financed under the national objective 6. Under the operating support mechanism, Lithuania wants to finance the maintenance and running costs of the national SIS.

**Tasks:** Implementation of the SIS II and ability to provide continuous operations of the national SIS II.
Services: maintenance and repair of the SIS II.
Operating support include comprehensive operational management and regular scheduled maintenance for all facility supporting infrastructure and assets or, simply, preventive maintenance for specific assets in the national SIS II infrastructure.

The national SIS II currently operates with “National copy” and without “Central queries” options. All national alerts are created by end-users of national registers of wanted objects – sources of the national SIS II. National SIS infrastructure (servers, data storage, local network and etc.) is located at the Information Technology and Communications Department under the MoI, which is the lead authority (technical functions) and national SIS II SPoC.

The national SIS II is administered by the MoI.
Operators of the national SIS II:
– Information Technology and Communications Department under the MoI;
– Lithuanian Criminal Police Office (the National SIRENE Bureau of International Relations Board of the Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau);
– Migration Department under Mol.

3.5. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 5: C- Preventing and combating crime/ISF-P Article 3(2)(a)

The disruption of the illicit drugs market, strengthened combat against cross-border drug trafficking and a measurable reduction of the availability of illicit drugs are the main priorities. Police and customs will seek to enhance police and judicial cooperation with other Member States and EU agencies and increase volume of intelligence led activities leading to disrupt criminal networks involved in cross-border drug trafficking and to suppress drug trafficking routes.

Lithuania intends to continue developing and improving corruption prevention and detection measures in public procurement, health care, financing political parties, the management of conflicts of interest and illicit enrichment. Corruption prevention and detection in the above-mentioned areas in particular will be provided through facilitating the management and exchange of information and raising transparency and publicity. In order to identify the sectors most affected by corruption certain technical equipment will be installed and infrastructural conditions will be improved. Most of the anti-corruption activities will be financed by the national budget.

Lithuania will continue to actively contribute to the joint European security-related activities of EU Member States by implementing the priorities set by the European Council to EU MS in the field of fight against organised and serious crime. Lithuanian law enforcement agencies partake in Investigations/joint operations related to five priorities of the EU policy cycle European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), namely THB; excise and MTIC; synthetic drugs; cybercrime; organised property crime.

Lithuania will enhance its network and information security and improve its resilience, identify gaps and further strengthen its capability to investigate and to combat cybercrime. Use funding to support bodies that make the link between research/academia, CERTs, law enforcement practitioners and the private sector and support programmes that allow for its active participation and contribution to the EC3.

Cross-border law enforcement cooperation and a cross-border culture of law enforcement officers will be improved through training. European elements in line with strand with LETS strand 1 and 2 will be included in specialized training of law enforcement officials.

Lithuania will seek to enhance the safety of witnesses by updating technical means applied in the
field of witness and victim protection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.5.1</th>
<th>National objective  1: C - prevention and combating / ISF-P Article 3(3)(a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:

- Strengthening of police capacities to prevent and combat cross-border, serious and organised crime by participation in JITs and EMPACT, obtaining information technologies, special means and technical equipment in criminal intelligence, as well as technical means and software to counter cybercrime
- Strengthening of police capacities by developing of investigative and research methods, special investigative and IT equipment, laboratory equipment, training on the use of the equipment and familiarization with new examination methods
- Capacity building for customs divisions carrying out criminal intelligence activities and pre-trial investigations by acquisition of hardware and software for the analysis of customs data, pre-trial investigation, criminal intelligence and risk management
- Capacity building for effective financial investigations and fight against corruption: creation of an inclusive data management platform for automated processing, analysis, storage and exchange of data about violations of the financial system, development of a criminal intelligence management system at the Special Investigation Service, tools for the anti-corruption education

Results:
- 2 EMPACT or JITs operational projects
- Improved capacity to prevent and combat cross-border and organised crime of 4 law enforcement authorities
- Achieved at least 50 % of forensic institutions’ fields of expertise to be accredited
- More effective identification and investigation of financial transactions related to the organised crime (based on SOCTA)
- Strengthen inter-institutional and international cooperation combating illicit drug circulation (including money laundering)
- More precise identification of corruption threats
- Raise public awareness of corruption
- Improved security and protection of intelligence information and its exchange

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<tr>
<th>3.5.2</th>
<th>National objective  2: C - exchange of information / ISF-P Article 3(3)(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:

- Development of capacities on cross-border information exchange and joint actions at the borders in accordance to the recommendations of the European Information Exchange Model (EIXM) through:
  - Installation of hardware and software necessary for the Lithuanian Police to conduct cross-border information exchange and joint actions on central and territorial levels,
  - Installation necessary office equipment for the cross-border information exchange in 24/7 mode,
  - Development of the cross-border information exchange statistical and
analytical tools.

- Modernisation of the Habitoscopic Data Register (HDR) and creation of working stations for the collection of HDR data through technologies of advanced personal face identification and personal search according to identification attribute, improvement of the interoperability of the HDR and other data registry systems, creation of working stations for the collection of HDR data in the territorial police units

- Creation of analytical measures for the Register of Criminal Offences (RCO) in order to improve the collection and the comparison of statistics at national and EU level through improvement of the system of collection of comparative crime statistics for transmission to designated European institutions and creation of the records of victims helping to develop support measures for victims

- Creation of a centralised Information system of Retained Data from electronic communications in public electronic communication networks by obtaining specialised hardware and software that would allow law enforcement authorities of Lithuania and the EU (automatically in 24/7 mode) to receive of Retained Data from electronic communications in the public electronic communication networks

Results:
- Creation of capacities of systemized police cross-border information exchange on central and territorial levels and implement EIXM
- Improved national infrastructures for habitoscopic data collection and analysis concerning international organised crime
- An improved system of collection of comparative crime statistics, created analytical measures based on data of the RCO
- Creation of uninterruptable receipt (24/7) of Retained Data from electronic communications in public electronic communication networks
- More secure and faster data exchange about electronic communications events and their participants among national law enforcement authorities of Lithuania and the EU

3.5.3 National objective 3: C - training / ISF-P Article 3(3)(c)

Lithuania plans to strengthen the national training system by establishing new training facilities, which meet the requirements and standards of modern, properly equipped training institutions, upgrading of existing and development of new and more sufficient and EU based training programmes (initial and vocational training) and capacity building for national police officers by linking their training and their career.

As the demand on training is much higher, than CEPOL or any other EU Agency can provide, the following training will be supported by the national programme:

- Specialised training to law enforcement officials on topics derived from the EU policies:
  - Improvement of police officers knowledge and skills in national and EU (internal and external) priority areas (including EU Policy Cycle, LETS, SOCTA, etc.), including specialised training for criminal intelligence officers
  - Special capacity building of the STT staff in the area of Criminal Prosecution for Corruption-Related Criminal Acts
  - Improvement of basic knowledge of the EU dimension of Law Enforcement (LETS strand 1) and bilateral, as well as multilateral cooperation (LETS strand 2), including foreign language training
- Improvement of knowledge and skills of forensic experts in carrying out examinations under the quality assurance requirements defined in Council Decision 2009/905/JHA of 30/11/2009 on the accreditation of forensic service providers carrying out laboratory activities

The LETS concept will be taken into account for all trainings. Specialised trainings will be coordinated with CEPOL. 6 % of all trained police personnel in accordance with this national objective will be trained by the national programme ISF.

### 3.5.4 National objective 4: C - Victim Support / ISF-P Article 3(3)(d)

Lithuania will strengthen the national mechanism for the coordination of combating trafficking in human beings, improve the prevention of trafficking in human beings, promote and develop measures for protection and support of witnesses and victims of crime.

Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:
- Protection and support of witness and victims of crime by modernisation of witness and victim protection centres (including physical security equipment, computers and other related technical measures) and improvement of the polygraph publication and press engineering systems

  The witness and victim protection centres should be modernised (repair of the protection centre premises, upgrading of the alarm and video surveillance systems, renovation of engineering facilities) with a view to ensure an efficient protection of witnesses and victims. The special task force of the police should be supplied with new polygraph publication and press engineering systems and communications means.

Results:
- The witness and victim protection centres are modernised
- The ability to create and print better (quality and safer) documents
- Usage of document forms in criminal intelligence and witness protection ensured

### 3.5.5 National objective 5: C - threat and risk assessment / ISF-P Article 3(3)(g)

The national strategy Lithuania focus upon a number of priorities in the near to medium term, including the following:
- Improving the understanding of threats and their effects upon society,
- A better incident management,
- Improving the involvement of stakeholders and the information sharing.

These priorities will be financed by the national budget.

### 3.6 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 6: Risk and crisis / ISF-P Article 3(2)(b)

In order to prevent violent extremism and terrorism more effectively Lithuania plans:
- To develop a comprehensive national strategy, including the inter-institutional coordination mechanism on combating terrorism;
- To prevent radicalisation;
- strengthen the prevention of terrorism financing;
- To improve an exchange and analysis of criminal intelligence;
- To improve law enforcement institutions cooperation and coordination at national level as well as with external EU and international partners, including the platforms for knowledge and exchange of experience between practitioners, based on the Anti-Radicalisation Network (RAN);
- To reduce the possibilities of the use of internet for terrorism purposes;
- To enhance the coherence and the effectiveness of EU external policy and action in conflict or crisis situations;
- To improve the protection and resistance of potential terrorism targets.

Lithuania plans the acquisition and further upgrading of technical equipment, expertise, secure facilities, especially ICT systems and their components at the Union level, including for the purpose of European cooperation on cyber security and cyber-crime, notably the European Cybercrime Centre as well as awareness-raising training in term of risk and crisis.

### 3.6.1. National objective 1: R - Prevention and Combating / ISF-P Article 3(3)(a)

Within preventing terrorist attacks, Lithuania will develop training for frontline practitioners working with individuals or groups at risk, not only for law enforcement and prison staff, but also e.g. for social workers, teachers, other educators and healthcare workers, developing their understanding of the process of radicalisation and how to respond to it; cooperate more closely with the civil society and the private sector to address challenges faced online; increase research into trends of radicalisation; work more closely with the Anti-Radicalisation Network (RAN) and partner countries outside the EU.

Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:

- Capacity building for the fight against terrorism perpetrated by individuals and prevention of violent attacks at national and EU level by obtaining equipment for the detection of cyber attacks and other cyber crimes, data collection, recording and expeditious preservation, as well as the data processing and analysis, equipment for responding to terrorist attacks (CBRN equipment, special utility vehicle, etc.), forensic laboratory equipment for carrying out examinations of explosive materials, firearms, ammunition and improvised devices

Results:

- Enhanced awareness of the phenomenon of radicalisation among first line practitioners and increased know-how capacity of practitioners how to recognise, prevent and tackle radicalisation
- Strengthened capabilities for a threat assessment, cooperation and information exchange between relevant stakeholders to prevent and counter radicalization
- Ensured public safety from terrorist threats by capacity building for the improving operational procedures, providing the most modern equipment

### 3.6.2 National objective 2: R - Exchange of information / ISF-P Article 3(3)(b)

Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:

- Establishment of platforms/networks for first-line practitioners to exchange
information/knowledge in order to develop a system for the monitoring, prevention or de-radicalisation of the radicalisation processes including the local community, local governance authorities and non-governmental organisations, identify possibilities for the promotion of radicalism and extremism and the methods of recruitment for terrorist activities, and seek to suppress the activities, make use of the possibilities made available by the Anti-Radicalisation Network (RAN) as set up by the EC, and exchange of best practices of other countries

- Preparing to an automated information exchange through the INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network (IBIN) through installation of an integrated ballistic identification system (IBIS) that would allow the law enforcement authorities of Lithuania to retain and automatically identify ballistic data obtained during the investigation of firearms related crimes and ballistic data exchange via the INTERPOL IBIN

Results:
- Better preparedness of first-line practitioners to react and prevent violent extremism and terrorism
- Created ballistic data retaining, identification and international exchanging system

3.6.3 National objective 3: R - Training / ISF-P Article 3(3)(c)

Examples of actions to be supported by EU funds:
- Awareness-raising training in terms of awareness on radicalisation for first line police officers on how to recognise, prevent and to tackle radicalisation, forensic science for police officers, criminal intelligence and investigation terrorism and other related crimes for police officers

In order improve capabilities of police officers in investigating terrorism and other related crimes, strengthen the capability of police officers to perform criminal intelligence and criminal prosecution and expand national and international cooperation in these areas 76 persons will be trained by the national programme, which consists of 0.03 % of all trained police officers per 2014-2020 years.

3.6.4 National objective 4: R - Victim support / ISF-P Article 3(3)(d)

Further development of a witness/victim support system, aiming in the first place at major crime cases (corruption, organised crime, murders, rapes etc.), as well as supporting war crime trials should be foreseen.

These key issues will be financed by the national budget.

3.6.5 National objective 5: R - Infrastructure / ISF-P Article 3(3)(e)

In order to improve the protection of critical infrastructure in Lithuania the following key initiatives have been envisaged:
- Following the procedure for identification and designation of the European critical infrastructure continue, on an ongoing basis, the process of identifying potential critical infrastructure in energy and transport sectors
- To develop a methodology for the identification of the critical information infrastructure, identify the critical information infrastructure objects based on the
methodology, define its organisational and technical cyber security requirements
- Contingency planning
- Accompanying financial measures
These key initiatives will be financed by the national budget.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.6.6</th>
<th>National objective  6: R - Early warning and crisis / ISF-P Article 3(3)(f)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In order to enhance the coherence and the effectiveness of EU external policy and action in conflict or crisis situations, Lithuania will:</td>
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<td>- To develop a single, common strategic vision for a conflict or crisis situation and for future EU engagement across policy areas</td>
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<td>- To focus on prevention</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- To develop procedures and capacities for rapid deployment of joint field missions where appropriate to conflict or crisis situations</td>
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<td>- To work in partnership</td>
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<td>This national objective will be financed by the national budget.</td>
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<tr>
<th>3.6.7</th>
<th>National objective  7: R - Threat and risk assessment / ISF-P Article 3(3)(g)</th>
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<td>In order to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure in Lithuania it is planned:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- To strengthen the capabilities for a threat assessment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- To expand public - private sector dialogue and information sharing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- To develop crisis prevention system and capabilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- To identify main risks for critical infrastructure and to strengthened its protection</td>
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<td></td>
<td>This national objective will be financed by the national budget.</td>
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Section 4 | Special Case: Operating support for the Special Transit Scheme (Lithuania)

4.1 | National Strategy

The following four national objectives shall govern the development and operation of the STS:

1. Upgrading of FTD/FRTD issuing and delivery systems
   The requirements to meet the objective:
   - To serve, timely renew and when necessary – acquire communication systems hardware and software
   - To upgrade computers, laptops, printers, MRZ scanners, office equipment
   - To improve working and living conditions of the staff serving the FTD/FRTD system in Russia
   - To ensure safe and reliable transfer of the STS personnel
   - To maintain around-the-clock communication between all officials involved in the STS.

2. Ensuring and development of the control over the persons travelling with FTD/FRTD by rail and other means of land transportation, detection and identification of violators of the facilitated transit regime
The requirements to meet the objective:
- To update document check and examination equipment
- To renew hardware and software
- To develop information systems for controlling persons travelling with the FTD/FRTD
- To improve the Kybartai road BCP infrastructure
- To install Wi-Fi network at the Kybartai railway BCP
- To maintain a secure database on the transit passengers
- To ensure proper digital mobile radio communication along the Kena–Kybartai railway.

3. Development of the electronic control system of transit trains proceeding from the Russian Federation to the Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federation and back through the territory of the Republic of Lithuania

The requirements to meet the objective:
- To modernise the system of the observation of the traffic of transit trains
- To upgrade video surveillance systems at the Kybartai BCP and the Kena BCP
- To install video surveillance systems at Kaišiadorys, Naujoji Vilnia and Vievis Rail Stations.

4. Improving the reaction capability of patrol units for the smooth functioning of transit by Russian citizens

The requirements to meet the objective:
- To acquire new vehicles and upgrade existing vehicles
- To modernise helicopters equipment
- To provide border guards with technical means for apprehension of illegal immigrants
- To strengthen dog handling units
- To develop information and communication systems ensuring the efficient control of persons traveling through Lithuania
- To improve the reaction capability of the Police through technical means of criminal intelligence (in line with the article 3.3 (b) of the ISF/B Regulation)
- To continue with courses and improve quality and methods of training.

The consular services, SBGS, Police, Public Security Service under the MoI, Information Technology and Communications Department under the MoI, JSC “Lietuvos geležinkeliai” (Lithuanian Railways), Police School of Lithuania, Directorate of Border Crossing Infrastructure and the Personalisation of Identity Documents Centre under the MoI are involved in the STS implementation. They will be responsible for the various aspects of the STS implementation in 2014-2020 as well.

Result: The smooth functioning of the STS.

4.2 Types of additional costs

The investment in infrastructure part will mainly cover the replacement of:
- equipment of FRTD and FTD issue and delivery systems (servers, disk storages, back up and communication equipment, software, etc.);
- old computers, laptops, printers, scanners, office equipment;
- equipment for the control over the persons travelling with the FRTDs/FTDs, identification and detection of violators of transit regime (document examination and verification equipment, night vision devices and thermal imaging cameras, fiberscopes, dioxide measurement devices, body armour, hardware and software of transport control system, development of the Unified Force Management
- equipment to ensure electronic control of transit trains (train monitoring system, video surveillance systems, etc.);
- hardware and software of digital radio communication and data transmission networks for the exchange of information between involved institutions within the territories of municipalities round the railway transit strip and principle transit roads;
- vehicles and means of transportation acquired by the institutions directly involved in the implementation of STS;
- renewal of working and living premises of the staff serving the FTD/FRTD system;
- dogs and dog handling gear.

Regular training of staff directly implementing STS must be continued as this is one of the requirements of the best practises of Schengen acquis implementation. Besides due to high turnover of police, border guards and consular staff, newcomers to the job must be trained to be able to implement STS.

Additional operation costs traditionally make a significant part of expenditure in STS and will be attributed to employing additional staff, maintenance costs of information and communication systems, vehicles, lease and maintenance of premises, costs of travel by train and accommodation in Kaliningrad, Minsk, St. Petersburg and Moscow for officials delivering FRTDs in transit trains, costs of renewing of uniforms and special clothes and other costs, directly related to the implementation of the STS.

In order to ensure smooth and fast checks of passengers travelling with FTDs and FRTDs 191 job positions established in the SBGS has been financed by the EU funds since 2014. The number of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff specifically implementing the STS is planned to be up to 119.

Foregone visa fees. Assuming that the flow of passengers using STS has experienced only minor fluctuations in the period starting from the year 2007, and therefore, is likely to stay stable, the average number of FRTD issued per year would be 285,184 as well as 6,342 FTD documents, in the period of 2014-2020. Thus foregone visa fees would amount 52.8 MEUR for the whole period of 2014-2020.

### Indicative Time Table

Indicative timetable: (Article 14(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014)

For each of the three main actions enter the year when it is planned (e.g. call for proposals), when it will be implemented (e.g. contracts/grants signed), and when the action will be closed or completed (e.g. final report).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of action</th>
<th>Start of planning</th>
<th>Start of implementation</th>
<th>Start of completing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO1: VISA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>SO1.OO1: V - national capacity</td>
<td>Implementation of the national VIS</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2015</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Upgrading of technical and communication</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Start Year</td>
<td>End Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO1.OO2: V-Union Acquis</td>
<td>Training for consular officers and staff of visa services</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO1.OO3: V-consular cooperation</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO1.SA1: V-consular cooperation</td>
<td>Broadening of representation for the purpose of issuing Schengen visas at the Consulate-General of the RL in Almaty;</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO1: EUROSUR</td>
<td>Strengthen exchange of information among all the authorities responsible for external border surveillance; Development of the national border surveillance system</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO2: Information exchange</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO3: common union standards</td>
<td>Implementation of biometric data verification system (Stage II)</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO4: B-Union Acquis</td>
<td>Specialised and advanced training for border guards</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO4: B-Union Acquis</td>
<td>Implementation of SchEval recommendations</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO5: future challenges</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO6: B - national capacity</td>
<td>Implementation of the national SIS</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upgrading of software and hardware to ensure compatibility between systems for data exchange</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquisition of technical means for border control</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO3: Operating Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO3.O01: Visa</td>
<td>Operational management of the national VIS</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO3.O02: Borders</td>
<td>Operational management of the national SIS</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO5: CRIME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO5.OO1: C - Prevention and combat</td>
<td>Strengthening of police capacities to prevent and combat cross-border and organised crime</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening of police capacities by developing of investigative and research methods</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity building for effective financial investigations and fight against corruption</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO5.OO2: C - Exchange of information</td>
<td>Modernisation of HDR and creation of working places for the collection of HDR data</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of analytical measures for the Register of Criminal Offences</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of a centralized Information system of</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO5.OO3: C-Training</td>
<td>Retained Data from electronic communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO5.OO4: C-Victim support</td>
<td>Specialised training to LE officials on topics derived from the EU policies</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO6.OO1: R-prevention and combating</td>
<td>Capacity building for the fight against terrorism perpetrated by individuals and prevention of violent attacks at national and EU level</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO6.OO2: R-Exchange of information</td>
<td>Establishment of the platforms/networks for first-line practitioners to exchange information/knowledge</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO6.OO3: R-Training</td>
<td>Preparing to automated information exchange through the INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network (IBIN)</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO6.OO4: R-victim support</td>
<td>Awareness-raising training</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator ID</th>
<th>Indicator description</th>
<th>Measurement unit</th>
<th>Baseline value</th>
<th>Target value</th>
<th>Source of data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>Number of consular cooperation activities developed with the help of the Fund:</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Projects (SO1.SA1, in Almaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Number of staff trained and number of training courses in common visa policy related aspects with the help of the Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2.1</td>
<td>(i) Number of staff trained</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Projects (3.1.2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2.2</td>
<td>(ii) Number of training courses (hours completed)</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80,000 hours</td>
<td>Projects (3.1.2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Number of specialised posts in third countries supported by the Fund</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>Percentage and number of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the total number of consulates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4.1</td>
<td>(i) Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Projects (3.1.2.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE SO2 BORDERS

**C1**
Number of staff trained and number of training courses in borders management related aspects with the help of the Fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C1.1</th>
<th>(i) Number of staff trained</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1960 persons</th>
<th>Projects, including STS instrument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1.2</td>
<td>(ii) Number of training courses (completed)</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98,000 hours</td>
<td>projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C2**
Number of border control (checks and surveillance) infrastructure and means developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund

| C2    | Number of border control (checks and surveillance) infrastructure and means developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund | Number | 0 | 108 vehicles for border surveillance Under STS – 94 vehicles for quick response to unauthorized detraining and/or attempts to illegally cross the external border | projects |

**C3.1**
Number of border crossings of the external borders through ABC gates supported from the Fund

| C3.1  | Number of border crossings of the external borders through ABC gates supported from the Fund | Number | 0 | 0 | projects |

**C3.2**
Total number of border crossings

| C3.2  | Total number of border crossings | Number | 0 | About 11 million persons per year | projects |

**C4**
Number of national border surveillance infrastructure

| C4    | Number of national border surveillance infrastructure | Number | 0 | 13 | projects |
established/further developed in the framework of EUROSUR

| C5   | Number of incidents reported by the Member State to the European Situational Picture | Number | 0 | ~4000 per year | projects |

### SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE SO5 CRIME

| C1   | Number of JITs and EMPACT operational projects supported by the Fund, including the participating Member States and authorities | Number | 0 | 2 | projects |

| C2   | Number of law enforcement officials trained on cross-border-related topics with the help of the Fund, and the duration of their training (person days) |  |   |   |   |

| C2.1 | (a) Number of law enforcement officials trained on cross-border-related topics with the help of the Fund | Number | 0 | 480 | projects |

| C2.2 | (b) Duration of the training (carried out) on cross-border related topics with the help of the fund. | Person days | 0 | 1440 | projects |

| C3   | Number and financial value of projects in the area of crime prevention |  |   |   |   |

| C3.1 | (a) number | Number | 0 | 4 | projects |

| C3.2 | (b) financial value | EUR | 0 | 198,000 | projects |

| C4   | Number of projects supported by the Fund, aiming to improve law enforcement information exchanges which are | Number | 0 | 3 | projects |
related to Europol data systems, repositories or communication tools (e.g. data loaders, extending access to SIENA, projects aiming to improving input to analysis work files etc.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE SO6 RISK AND CRISIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>C1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S.1** Description of programme specific indicator S.1

In the case where the national programme includes programme specific indicators provide: the link to the relevant specific objective; a description of the indicator; the measurement unit; the baseline value; the target value to reach; and the source of the data. Each programme specific indicator must be linked to a single
**Section 6: Framework for Preparation and Implementation of the Programme by the Member State**

6.1 Partnership involvement in the preparation of the programme (Article 12(3) of Regulation (EU) N° 514/2014)

Summary of the approach taken, the involvement of partners and key stages of broader consultation where relevant, including a list of the main partners (or types of partners involved or consulted).

In March 2013, following the principle of partnership, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) of Lithuania has officially invited relevant authorities and bodies concerned to submit proposals on the programme. The proposals were submitted by:

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania;
- SBGS;
- Information Technology and Communications Department under the Mol;
- Personalisation of Identity Documents Centre under the Mol;
- Police Department under the Mol;
- Special Investigation Service;
- Financial Crime Investigation Service under the Mol;
- Customs of the Republic of Lithuania;
- Forensic Science Centre of Lithuania;
- State Forensic Medicine Service;
- State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania;
- Public Security Service under the Mol;
- Fire and Rescue Department under the Mol;
- VIP Protection Department.

By its Order No. 1V-388 of 2 May 2013, the Mol set up a working group for drawing up of the programme. The working group consists of 9 members who represent the Mol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Border Guard Service under the Mol, Police Department under the Mol, Financial Crime Investigation Service under the Mol, Public Security Service under the Mol and Fire and Rescue Department under the Mol. The
working group is chaired by the Vice-minister of the MoI. On the basis of proposals from the institutions (intended beneficiaries) the working group analysed the proposals, evaluated their compliance with the requirements provided by Specific Regulations and drafted a financial plan of the national ISF programme. After that the MoI acting in close cooperation with the institutions that are responsible for the security of the EU external borders, functioning of the STS and (or) crime prevention, combating cross-border, serious and organised crime, prepared a draft of the ISF programme. The MoI ensured that there was no conflict of interest among the partners at the different stages of the programming cycle.

6.2 Monitoring Committee (Article 12(4) of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014)

The Monitoring Committee will be set up after the assignment of functions among the institutions managing the Funds by an Order of the MoI and shall carry out the following (and other) functions:

- consider and approve the criteria for selecting the projects;
- periodically review progress made towards achieving the specific objectives of the assistance;
- examine the results of implementation, particularly the achievement of the targets set for the different measures;
- consider and approve the annual and final implementation reports before they are sent to the Commission;
- make a proposal to the RA for amendments and revision of the national programme;
- examine and adopt the amendments to the programme proposed by the RA;
- it may in any event propose to the RA any adjustment or review of the assistance likely in order to allow possible the attainment of the objectives of the Fund or to improve the management of assistance, including in respect of financial management;
- carry out periodic progress evaluations;
- propose to the RA on evaluations of the programme;
- perform other functions and tasks originating from its rules of procedure.

6.3 Common monitoring and evaluation framework (Article 14(2)(f) of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014)

The MoI will be responsible for the proper management and controls of the Funds in compliance with the applicable rules and the principle of sound financial management. The MoI will carry out first level (administrative and on-the-spot) controls, declare expenditure to the Commission and sign the management declaration of assurance and related documents.

The MoI will use a computerised monitoring system to support the collection of monitoring data and to track progress in achieving the objectives and targets agreed in the national programmes.

The interim and ex-post evaluations will be carried out by evaluation experts that are functionally independent from the Responsible Authorities, Audit Authorities and Delegated Authorities.
With a view to transparency and accountability the evaluation reports will be made public through traditional means of publication in the form of printed copies and/or by publication on the website of the MoI.

6.4 Partnership involvement in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the national programme (Article 12(3) and 14(2)(h) of Regulation (EU) N° 514/2014)

The Fund programme was developed by the MoI in cooperation with the institutions assigned to the MoI and other authorities ensuring national security. The following national authorities will be involved in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the national programme:

- SBGS;
- Police Department under the MoI;
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania;
- ITCD;
- Financial Crime Investigation Service under the MoI;
- Special Investigation Service;
- State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania;
- Personalisation of Identity Documents Centre under the MoI;
- Public Security Service under the MoI;
- Customs of the Republic of Lithuania;
- Forensic Science Centre of Lithuania;
- State Forensic Medicine Service;
- Police School of Lithuania;
- Directorate of Border Crossing Infrastructure under the Ministry of Transport and Communications;
- JSC “Lietuvos geležinkeliai” (Lithuanian Railways).

It has been decided that the Fire and Rescue Department under the MoI and the VIP Protection Department in their role to support civil protection measures will not participate in the implementation of the programme. Participation of non-state actors will be considered in the implementation of the programme.

6.5 Information and publicity (Article 14(2)(j) and 53 of Regulation (EU) N° 514/2014)

Lithuania will ensure that a website or a website portal is provided with

- information on and access to the national programme;
- information on potential beneficiaries about funding opportunities under the national programme;
- information for the citizens on the role and the achievements of the Specific Regulations through information and communication actions on the results and impact of the national programme.

Lithuania will ensure transparency on the implementation of the national programme and maintain a list of actions supported by each national programme which will be accessible through the website or the website portal.

Further information and publicity actions may also be carried out during the course of the
6.6 Coordination and complementarity with other instruments (Article 14(2)(e) and 14(5)(f) of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014)

With a view to assessing the extent and the areas that could be financed from several Funds, Lithuania had carried out an analysis of the similarity and the compatibility of the priorities, tasks and objectives of the European Structural and Investment funds, as well as of other financial instruments.

A number of other EU instruments will provide support to activities which are complementary to the activities that will be financed under the ISF:

- European Structural and Investment Funds;
- European Territorial Co-operation cross-border programmes (ETC);
- Asylum and Migration Fund;
- Cross-Border Cooperation programme within European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI CBC);
- Action plan for the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.

During the assessment of the complementarity of the European Structural and the Investment Funds, it was identified that the support allocated from the ISF will contribute to the implementation of the thematic objectives 1, 2 and 11:

- strengthening research, technological development and innovation;
- enhancing access to, and use and quality of, information and communication technologies;
- enhancing institutional capacity and an efficient public administration.

The MoI is responsible for the coordination of the ETC and ENI/CBC programmes thus, coordination between these programmes will be assured at the MoI.

Anti-corruption measures and training for the employees are complementary to the thematic objective 11 of the European Social Fund.

The support from the ISF will contribute to the implementation of the sub-objective “better cooperation in fighting cross-border crime” of the priority areas "Crime – Fighting cross-border crime" coordinated by Finland and Lithuania of the Action plan for the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.

With a view to reduce the scope of and the damage caused by cross-border crime, the support allocated from the ISF will contribute to the implementation of the measures funded from other funding sources (the 7th Framework Programme, Civil Protection Financial Instrument, General Programme "Fundamental Rights and Justice", General Programme “Security and Safeguarding Liberties”, General Programme "Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows", “Customs 2020”, “Hercule II”, “Pericles” programme).

All the necessary measures will be taken in order to ensure proper coordination with initiatives supported through these and other relevant external aid instruments. Such coordination will be ensured at different levels, firstly through the reciprocal involvement and consultation of all the concerned (or potentially concerned)
The Monitoring Committee intends to include into its composition, as members or as observers, representatives of institutions responsible for the use of other related financial instruments. The participation of such representatives and partners would be specifically important at the meetings discussing issues related to the implementation of specific objectives.

6.7 Beneficiaries

6.7.1 List the five main types of beneficiaries of the programme (use the list below)

Only State authorities as the type of beneficiaries of the programme it is foreseen.

The types of beneficiaries are: State/federal authorities, local public bodies, non-governmental organisations, international public organisations, national Red Cross, International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, private and public law companies, education/research organisations, social partners.

6.7.2. Direct award (if applicable)

Indicate the national objective, when it is intended to use direct award and provide a justification for each circumstance.

The Fund intervenes in the areas where either de jure monopolies of national administrations exist or where security reasons exclude a possibility of an open call for proposals.

All potential beneficiaries (SBGS, Police Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Security Service, etc.) of the EU funds are the only entities invested with the powers to carry out such activities, in which case a de jure or de facto a monopoly situation exists.

Actions under the Fund will be implemented on the basis of a restricted call for proposals.

The grounds justifying the use of a direct award will be set out in the award decision.

SECTION 7: THE FINANCING PLAN OF THE PROGRAMME (ARTICLE 14(2)(I) OF REGULATION (EU) NO 514/2014)

7.1 Financing plan of the national programme specifying, for the whole programming period, the amount of the total EU contribution to each specific objective pursued. The amounts for national objectives within a specific objective are indicative. The total technical assistance expenditure is indicated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 7.1.1: Financing Plan ISF-Borders</th>
<th>TABLE 7.1.2: Financing Plan ISF-Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding priorities</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO1.OO1:V - national capacity</td>
<td>2,070,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO1.OO2: V - Union Acquis</td>
<td>210,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO1.OO3:V - consular cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal for national objectives in Visa</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,280,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO1.SA1: Consular cooperation</td>
<td>810,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 1: SO1 Visa</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,090,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO1.OO2:B - EUROSUR</td>
<td>12,232,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO2:B - information exchange</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO3:B - common Union standards</td>
<td>1,595,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO4:B - Union Acquis</td>
<td>657,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO5:B Future challenges</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.OO6:B - national capacity</td>
<td>6,619,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal for national objectives in Borders</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,104,873</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2.SA1:FRONTEX equipment</td>
<td>315,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 2: SO2: BORDERS</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,419,873</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO3.O01:Visa</td>
<td>520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO5.OO1:C-prevention and combat</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,263,561</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>SO5.OO2:C-exchange of information</td>
<td>3,262,453</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO5.OO3:C-training</td>
<td>957,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO5.OO4:C-victim support</td>
<td>952,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO5.OO5:C-threat &amp; risk assessment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 5: SO5: Crime</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,408,206</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO6.OO1:R-prevention and combat</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO6.OO2:R-exchange of information</td>
<td>164,950</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO6.OO3:R-training</td>
<td>47,500</td>
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<td>SO6.OO4:R-victim support</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO6.OO5:R-infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO6.OO6:R-early warning &amp; crisis</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO6.OO7:R-threat &amp; risk assessment</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 6: 06: C-Risks and crisis</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,712,450</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum: 200,000 + ((total allocation) * 5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL 7 = ( total 5 + total 6) + 5% total allocation</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,120,656</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 7.2 Financing plan by financial year (in Euro)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISF - Borders Total 4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41 990 278</td>
<td>39 278 833</td>
<td>29 087 481</td>
<td>25 672 705</td>
<td>25 996 351</td>
<td>17 804 225</td>
<td>179 829 873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF - Police (TOTAL 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 635 211</td>
<td>3 096 778</td>
<td>2 617 994</td>
<td>2 256 891</td>
<td>2 256 891</td>
<td>2 256 891</td>
<td>16 120 656</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3. Justification for any deviation from the minimum shares set in the Specific Regulations. (Only required if the minima are not met) Article 6(2) of Regulation (EU) N° 515/2014 and Article 5(6) of Regulation (EU) N° 513/2014

Not applicable.
OPERATING SUPPORT ANNEX

Indicative planning form for operating support under national programme

This attached form will not form part of the Commission decision approving the national programme.

For each type of operating support (visa or borders) please provide:

(i) An indicative list of beneficiary:
- name of the beneficiary (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, immigration section of the police, coast guard, port authority, immigration section of the police, armed forces) and its legal status (e.g. Public authority, public liability company, etc.)
- with their statutory responsibilities
- the main types of tasks performed in relation to border management / visas, including tasks expected to be supported;

Add more rows as necessary.

(ii) an indicative list of tasks: describe the main types of tasks performed by the beneficiary in relation to:
- visa issuance, including tasks expected to be supported under article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014; or
- border management, which are expected to be supported under article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014. It is not necessary to describe all tasks performed by a beneficiary but only those that are linked to border management and immigration control (e.g. Armed Forces performing surveillance at sea to prevent illegal entries).

The tasks must be aggregated by geographical location where they will be performed (e.g. Consulate General in Beijing or Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Slovakian-Ukrainian border). To the extent possible provide the border section for each task described under operating support for borders.

(iii) an indicative number of staff: If applicable, please indicate the number of staff concerned and expected to be supported for each beneficiary and task (as full-time equivalent for the total duration of the operational support).

(iv) an indicative budget breakdown by type of beneficiary in the following cost categories:
Staff costs, including for training
Service costs, such as maintenance and repair
Upgrading / replacement of equipment
Real estate (depreciation, refurbishment)
IT systems (operational management of VIS, SIS and new IT systems, rental and Refurbishment of premises, communication infrastructure and security)
Operations (costs not covered by the previous above categories)
## Indicative Planning Form I: Operating support for VISA

### Part I.1: Indicative list of tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Consulates and other entities located in other countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Central and other entities (centralised specialised services in visa issuance and whose delivery is not linked to any specific location(e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Visa Affairs Department))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Information Technology and Communication department under the Ministry of Interior – responsible for technical support of the VIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task: maintenance of the national VIS</td>
<td>Information Technology and Communication Department under the Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Part I.2: Indicative budget breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiary: Information Technology and Communication Department under the MoI</th>
<th>Total per beneficiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 staff costs, including for training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 service costs, such as maintenance and repair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 upgrading / replacement of equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 real estate (depreciation, refurbishment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 IT systems (operational management of VIS, SIS and new IT systems, rental and refurbishment of premises, communication infrastructure and security)</td>
<td>520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Operations (costs not covered by the previous above categories)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>520,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Indicative Planning Form II: Operating support for Borders

### Part II.1: Indicative list of tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Land Borders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sea Borders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Air Borders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Central and other services (centralised specialised services in border management and whose delivery is not linked to any specific location (e.g. risk analysis performed at Border Guard’s headquarters, training activities))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Information Technology and Communication Department under the Ministry of interior – responsible for technical support of the SIS II</td>
<td>Information technology and Communication department under the Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task: Maintenance of the SIS II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Part II.2: Indicative budget breakdown

| 1. Beneficiary: Information Technology and Communication Department under the MoI |
|-------------------|---------------------------|
| 1.1 | staff costs, including for training |
| 1.2 | service costs, such as maintenance and repair |
| 1.3 | upgrading / replacement of equipment |
| 1.4 | real estate (depreciation, refurbishment) |
| 1.5 | IT systems (operational management of VIS, SIS and new IT systems, rental and refurbishment of premises, communication infrastructure and security) |
| 1.6 | Operations (costs not covered by the previous above categories) |

**Total per beneficiary:** 800,000